



6. If no tariff is imposed, then lower-cost shrimp "farmers" will survive and higher-cost shrimp "hunters" will not:






Shrimp hunters have higher ATC and smaller MES.

Shrimp farmers have lower ATC and larger MES.

Long-run equilibrium will occur with market price equal to P_F and only those shrimpers whose costs are that low surviving in the market.

If a tariff is imposed that raises imported shrimp costs up to P_H , then the market output will be produced by a mix of high-cost domestic shrimp hunters and low-cost-plus-tariff imported shrimp farmers. Market price will rise to P_H and market quantity demanded will decline:



no tariff: $P = P_F$ $Q = \sum q_F$

tariff: $P = P_H$ $Q' = \sum q_H + \sum q_F$, $m < n$

2.

$$C(Q) = 100 + Q^2, \quad MC = \frac{dC}{dQ} = 2Q$$


$$P(Q) = 40 - Q, \quad TR = 40Q - Q^2, \quad MR = 40 - 2Q$$

$$(a) \quad MR = MC \Rightarrow 40 - 2Q = 2Q, \quad Q = 10$$

$$P = 40 - Q = \$30$$

$$\pi = TR - TC = 40Q - Q^2 - 100 - Q^2 = \$100$$

(b) see diagram. The $MR = MC$ necessary condition for maximum profit is illustrated by the slopes of the TR and TC functions. They are equal where profits are maximized.



3.


13.8 a. For perfect competition, $MC = \$10$. For monopoly $MC = \$12$. $Q_D = 1000 - 50P$. The competitive solution is $P = MC = \$10$. Thus $Q = 500$.

$$\text{Monopoly: } P = 20 - \frac{1}{50} Q, PQ = 20Q - \frac{1}{50} Q^2$$

$$\text{Produce where } MR = MC. MR = 20 - \frac{1}{25} Q = 12. Q = 200, P = \$16$$

b. See graph below.

$$\text{Loss of consumer surplus} = \text{Competitive CS} - \text{monopoly CS} = 2500 - 400 = 2100.$$



c.

Of this 2100 loss, 800 is a transfer into monopoly profit, 400 is a loss from increased costs under monopoly, and 900 is a "pure" deadweight loss.

4.

$$L = 50w \Rightarrow w = \frac{L}{50}$$

$$MP_L = 2 \text{ tons/hr} ; P_{\text{coal}} = \$10/\text{ton}$$

$$VMP_L = \$20 \text{ per worker hour}$$

$$\text{monopsony: total labor cost} = w(L) \cdot L = \frac{L^2}{50}$$

$$MFC_L = \frac{d(TLC)}{dL} = \frac{L}{25}$$

$$VMP_L = MFC_L \Rightarrow \frac{L}{25} = 20 \Rightarrow L = 500 \text{ workers}$$

$$w = \frac{L}{50} = \$10 \text{ per hour for } \pi \text{ max}$$

$$\text{competition: } VMP_L = w, \text{ so } w = \$20$$

$$L = 50w, \text{ so } L = 1000 \text{ under competition}$$

5.

16.5

a. $\text{Grant} = 6000 - .75(I)$

If $I = 0$ $\text{Grant} = 6000$

$I = 2000$ $\text{Grant} = 4500$

$I = 4000$ $\text{Grant} = 3000$.


b. $\text{Grant} = 0$ when $6000 - .75I = 0$

$I = 6000 / .75 = 8000$

c. Assume there are 8000 hours in the year.

Full Income = $4 \cdot 8000 = 32,000 = c + 4h$.

d. Full Income = $32,000 + \text{grant} = 32,000 + 6000 - .75 \cdot 4(8000 - h) = 38,000 - 24,000 + 3h = c + 4h$ or $14,000 = c + h$ for $I = 8,000$. That is: for $h > 6,000$ hours welfare grant creates a kink at 6,000 hours of leisure.



e.

f. New budget constraint is $23,000 = c + 2h$ for $h > 5,000$.

g. Income and substitution effects of law change work in opposite directions (see graph). Substitution effect favors more work; income effect, less work.

mm