1.

- 6. a. If videos are given away (P = \$0), demand is predicted to be: Q = 1600 (200)(0) = 1,600. At this output, firm A's cost is 1,200 + (2)(1,600) = \$4,400, and firm B's cost is (4)(1,600) = \$6,400. Firm A is the cheaper option and should be chosen. (In fact, firm A is cheaper as long as Q > 600.)
 - b. To maximize profit, we simply set MR = MC for each supplier and compare the maximum profit attainable from each. We know that MR = 8 Q/100 and the marginal costs are MC_A = 2 and MC_B = 4. Thus, for firm A, we find: $8 Q_A/100 = 2$, and so $Q_A = 600$ and $P_A = 5 (from the price equation). For firm B, we find that $Q_B = 400$ and $P_B = 6 . The station's profit is: 3,000 [1,200 + (2)(600)] = \$600 with firm A. Its profit is 2,400 1,600 = \$800 with firm B. Thus, an order of 400 videos from firm B (priced at \$6 each) is optimal.
- 12. a. The MC per passenger is \$20. Setting MR = MC, we find 120 .2Q = 20, so Q = 500 passengers (carried by 5 planes). The fare is \$70 and the airline's weekly profit is \$35,000 10,000 = \$25,000.
 - b. If it carries the freight, the airline can fly only 4 passenger flights, or 400 passengers. At this lower volume of traffic, it can raise its ticket price to P = \$80. Its total revenue is (80)(400) + 4,000 = \$36,000. Since this is greater than its previous revenue (\$35,000) and its costs are the same, the airline should sign the freight agreement.
- 3. 2. a. Q = 180 (1.5)(80) = 60 pairs. $R = P \cdot Q = \$4,800$.
 - b. At P=\$100 and Q=30 pairs revenue falls to \$3000 per month.
 - c. $E_P = (dQ/dP)(P/Q)$. At P = \$80, $E_P = (-1.5)(80/60) = -2$; At P = \$100, $E_P = (-1.5)(100/30) = -5$. Demand is much more elastic at the higher price.

- b. Using the markup rule, we can see that with a price elasticity of -4 the profit-maximizing markup is 25%. And note that this only reflects short-term profit maximization. An even smaller markup may be optimal when one considers long-run demand. Thus the 50% markup goal was unrealitical and far from profit-maximizing.
- 5. Because demand conditions differ, the operator can profit from a policy of price discrimination. She faces a pure selling problem. To maximize weekday revenue (and profit) set $MR_d = 36 .2Q_d = 0$ implying $Q_d = 180$ and $P_d = 18 per round. On weekends, we have $MR_w = 50 Q_w/6 = 0$ implies $Q_w = 300$. But $Q_w = 240$ represents full capacity of the golf course. This is the best that the operator can do. The price is P=\$30.
 - b. To deter defections (and preserve revenue), the operator should narrow the price gap: raise weekday prices and lower weekend prices slightly.
 - (a) arc elasticity of demand: $\eta = [1000/(4000 + 5000)]/[1/(3 + 2)] = 5/9 = 0.555$.

6.

(b) If total costs are the same, you should charge the higher price of \$3. Total revenue increases when you raise price in an inelastic portion of the demand curve.

(c) If the income elasticity of demand is 0.5, then richer households spend a smaller proportion of their total income on video rentals than do poorer households. A \$1 per unit tax on videos thus will proportionately fall more heavily on poorer households than richer households, and hence will be a regressive tax.

7. Current markup =
$$1570$$

Hence MC must equal \$1.70.

Optimal markup = $7 - MC$
 $E_p = \frac{7.\Delta Q}{70 \Delta P} = \frac{4070}{7070} = -4$

Optimal markup thus is $\frac{P-MC}{P} = \frac{1}{4} = 2570$.

so the current markup of 1570 is not enough.

 $P = (\frac{E_p}{1-E_p}) MC$
 $P = (\frac{-4}{1-4}) (1.70) = \frac{4}{3} (1.70) = \pm 2.26$